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SOME THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES
OF COMPARING LONG TERM INTEREST RATES
AT DIFFERENT AND ESPECIALLY AT
WIDELY SEPARATED DATES
A.RATEof interest arises out of an exchange of present money for
a promise to make one or more future money payments. It is a peculiar
inverse function of the price paid for the promise. The pro1mise is
personal property—a chose in action.It may be bought and sold like
any commodity. The problem of comparing the prices—or yields—of
such promises at different dates is naturally very similar, in some re-
spects, to the problem of comparing the prices of commodities at dif-
ferent dates.However, because the promise, ifit be considered a
commodity, is undoubtedly a commodity sui generis, the two problems
are in some significant ways decidedly different.
Let us first notice an important similarity. Just as there are differ-
ent commodities, so are there different promises. To talk of the price
of bonds—or, inversely, of the rate of interest—is like talking of the
commodity price.In any important market at any particular time
there are many commodities and many commodity prices, many
promises and many rates of interest. And the promises, like the com-
modities, differ not only as to their nature but also as to their quality.
To compare call nioney rates on the New York Stock Exchange in
1890 with the yield of West Shore 4's in 1936 would be almost as
absurd as to compare the price of potatoes in London in the year 1800
with the price of pig tin in the same city in the year 1900. And to
compare the yield of a low grade bond at one date with the yield of a
high grade bond at another date would be nearly as meaningless. For
commodity prices or interest rates at different dates to be significantly
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comparable, the prices must be the prices of identical or approximately
identical commodities and the rates the returns from identical or ap-
proximately identical loans.
But here we strike an important difference between the two problems.
It is much easier to decide whether two commodities at different dates
are approximately identical than it is to decide whether two loans at
different dates are approximately identical, though, even in the corn-
niodity price problem, this difficulty is much greater than it at first
sight seems to be.
The brute materiality of physical objects tends to obscure the fact
that, as econoniists, we are interested in only certain of their psychic
implications. While the feeblest intelligence may grasp that the eco-
nomic significance of a bond lies in the promise it represents and not in
the mere piece of paper, it is not so easy to see that the economic im-
portance of each and every economic good lies in its possibility of
satisfying human desires and not in its mere physical presence, and that
consequently a particular physical object may have great economic
significance at a particular date even though its importance was negli-
gible at an earlier date or will be so at a later date. Even if they were
not subject to physical deterioration or change, innumerable manufac-
tured objects would have an economic history more or less like that of
a moustache cup, a hoop skirt, a spinning wheel, an hour glass or a
prairie schooner. Though the particular physical object be unused and
therefore remain physically unchanged, its economic significance (for
all other purposes than those of the antiquarian) dribbles away like
water out of a leaky pot. Even if a Model T Ford of the vintage of
1916 had been preserved in a vacuum, what would it sell for now?
The value attached to particular economic goods changes with the in-
troduction of new means of satisfying desires.
The change with time in the economic significance of physical ob-
jects is one of the chief obstacles encountered in the problem of
attempting to compare the 'general level' of commodity prices at widely
different dates. During the last twenty years there has been a great
increase in the comfort and mechanical efficiency of the transportation
that the automobile purchaser gets I or his dollar. 'Automobile prices'
are much lower than they. were twenty years ago. But exactly how
much lower? What can one mean by 'automobile prices'? What. corn-
rnodity can we use in 1936 to compare with a Model T Ford in. 1916,56 BOND YIELDS AND STOCK PRICES
•and what can we use in 1916 to compare with any of the standard
models of 1936?
An automobile may present a rather extreme illustration of obsoles-
cence, but a similar process goes on with respect to most commodities,
and the longer the time elapsed the greater become the difficulties of
adequate comparison. To compare the cost of living in Boston in 1938
with its cost in 1838 may not be quite so difficult as to compare the cost
of living in a small village in the far north of Canada with the cost of
living in a small village in the interior of Brazil, hut the sources of
at least One of the difficulties are the same. Many of the commodities
that are used in the one time or place are quite different from those
used in the other time or place. While buggies, candles, spinning wheels
and clipper ships may have been important in the economic life of
Boston one hundred years ago their present importance in the same city
is virtually nil.
In Chapter II we drew attention to the fact that the relative economic
importance of a particular type of loan may be much greater in one
place than it is in another place at the same time, or at one time than
it was at another time in the same place. In this respect the difficulties
of comparin.g interest rates at different dates are somewhat similar to
those to which we have just been referring in connection with com-
modity prices. However, we must now draw the reader's attention to
some peculiarities of promises to pay that make interest rate compari-
sons even more difficult than commodity price comparisons.
Though their relative economic importance may change, there are
many commodities whose physical are practically the
same yesterday, today and forever. A ton of pig iron in 1938 may. be
physically the same as was a ton of pig iron in 1838. Systems of grad-
ing such commodities as wheat, corn or cotton make it possible to
quote the prices of virtually the same physical things over long periods.
But the problem of graditig loans is quite another story.
A loan isnot a physical thing. The buyer of a bond doesnot buy
even future money, he buys oniy a promise to make future payments.
And that promise may become as unsubstantial as was the grin of the
Cheshire cat after the cat itself had vanished. Earnings may disappear
and even apparently sound collateral become valueless. The price of a
bushel of wheat or a ton of pig iron can be determined in the open
market without knowledge of who grew the one or mined theDIFFiCULTiES OF COMPARISON 57
but the value of a bond cannot be even estimated from an analysis of
its terms without considering the degree of confidence that should be
placed in the promises it contains. The question, what should middling
upland spot cotton sell for at the present moment on the New York
Cotton Exchange has at least some meaning; but the question, what
is a fair price at the present time on the New York Stock Exchange for
a 4 per cent bond maturing in twenty years has none. To mean any-
thing the latter cluestion would have to tell us something about the
'grade' of the 4 per cent bond.
But the 'grade' of a bond is the grade of the promise it represents.
For the yield of a bond at one date to be as legitimately comparable
with the yield of another bond at another date as is the price of a pound
of middling upland spot cotton af one date with the price of aiiother
pound of middling upland spot cotton at another date, the promise
represented by the one bond at the one date should be the same or
virtually the same as the promise represented by the other bond at the
other date not merely with respect to terms 1butalso with respect to
goodness.
But with respect to what kind of 'goodness' should the promises be
equivalent? In the first place, it clearly cannot be that essential and
intrinsic goodness—or lack of goodness—that a determinist philoso-
pher might say the bond possessed on the date in question but which
would not be made apparent until the date of maturity.2For, if we
interpret 'goodness' in this manner, we must grade the promises of all
bonds that, in fact, made all 'interest' payments and the 'principal' pay-
nient on the dates called for in the bonds as perfect—exactly one hun-
dred per cent 'good'—cluring all the time the loans were outstanding.
But the possession of this unforeknown and unforeknowable 'perfec-
tion' would be a quite fantastic reason for believing in the legitimacy
and usefulness of comparing the yield of one such 'perfect' l?ondl at one
date with the yield of another such bond at another date. We must re-
member that the yields of such 'perfect' bonds differ tremendously on
the samedates.Though two 4 per cent bonds maturing in twenty years
may each meet all future obligations on time, the one bond may he
selling at the present moment on a per cent basis and the other on
a 6 per cent basis.
For the usual bond, maturity and coupon rate.
2Incase of default, perhaps noteventhen.Cf. Aristotle, DeInferpretatione, Ch.9.58 BOND YIELDS AND STOCK PRICES
In grading bonds at any particular date, we are concerned with how
good the bonds were, not with how good they tuirned oust to be.It is,
of course, true that, in a metaphysical sense, how good they turned out
to be was how good they really were. But prices and yields can be
directly affected only by forecasts of the future, never by the facts of
the future. It is, therefore, to forecasts that we must restrict our con-
cept of goodness. It is true that to grade bonds on any1 basis of how
good they seemed to be, or even should have seemed to be, is to lean
upon a flimsy reed. But there clearly is nothing else to do.
Having come to this conclusion, we are faced with the question,
should the gradin.g be based on actual orideal forecasting, on how
good the bonds seemed to be or on how good they should have seemed
to be. At once we notice that any 'should have seemed' grading is
tarred with the same stick as grading based on what the future eventu-
ally revealed.It is almost always clear, after the event, that, though
the future was essentially unknowable, a more shrewd and intelligent
analysis of the facts that were available should have prevented much of
the bad forecasting that actually occurred.
And this difficulty cannot be overcome by arbitrarily limiting the
range of facts upon which forecasts 'should have' been based. The
essential element in any 'should have' system of grading must clearly
be that no pertinent and important consideration shall be neglected.
To for example, that, for purposes of yield comparisons, bonds
can be more correctly graded by some simple mathematical formula
whose variables are all derivable from either present or past financial
reports of the debtor corporation than they are in fact graded in the open
market is to exhibit an optimism that is difficult if not impossible to
defend.
The most intelligent bond buyers are of course interested in how
their bonds are 'rated' by the better statistical services, but they desire
and obtain more information than is yielded by the symbols AA or
B1+. Some years ago the executives of a large statistical organization,
which had for years been publishing bond 'ratings', finally came to be-
lieve so strongly in the reliability of their own ratings that they
initiated a 'switching' service for bond owners. The theoryupon which
the service was based was that, if a client owned bonds thatwere
selling on a definitely lower yield basis than theaverage yield of bonds
of the same 'rating', he should sell them and 'switch' into bonds of theDIFFICULTIES OF COMPARISON 59
same ratin.g but selling on a higher yield basis. The 'service' was soon
abandoned.
But, even if the difficulty of deciding how the bonds should have
been graded were much less than it is, the question would still have to be
answered, is this the kind of grading demanded by the problem? When
comparisons of even commodity prices at different dates are being
made, is not the relevancy of the prices dependent on what the buyers
and sellers thought they were exchanging rather than on what they
actually were buying and selling? Has not the comparative ease of dis-
covering, for so many important commodities, what actually is being
bought and sold obscured the fact that this consideration is, after all
and paradoxical as it may sound, in some respects of only secondary
significance?
Because a seemingly normal and healthy dairy cow that had been
sold 'as is' by one farmer to another for one hundred dollars died the
following day, the price paid is not described as a price for moribund
cattle; though, if the condition of the cow had been apparent at the
time of sale, she should have been priced on the basis of 'hide and
tallow'.3If, before the Cripple Creek strike in Colorado, the land on
which the mines were later located had been bought and sold as grazing
land, no student of prices would now think of describing the early
prices per acre as prices per acre of an extremely rich gold field. If a
consignment of eggs were sold at a sheriff's sale, without recourse, and
if the buyers had understood and believed that the eggs were at least
relatively innocuous, the price would not be describable as a price of
'spots and rots'—even though that was the real status of the con-
Si gnment.
Bonds vary in quality as much as do eggs; and the history of bond
It is, of course, true that unless the farmer wanted the cow in order to supply his
own family with milk, he was buying not merely a promise to provide that future
commodity but more fundamentally a promise to provide future money income. The
purchase of a cow could have turned out to be a poor not because the
cow died but because of a fall in the price of milk. This is, however, completely,
outside the realm of ordinary commodity price history. The student of the history of
commodity prices carl and does brush such considerations aside. He presents a table
showing dairy cattle prices at different dates without discussing whether the pur-
chasers did or did not act wisely. He is recounting the prices of an economic good
that is also a physical object and his definition is in terms of physical characteristics.
His is a history of the prices of physical objects as those prices were made by
people who believed they were buying things having such and such physical char-
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prices demonstrates conclusively that, unlike eggs, bonds are usually
graded very incorrectly by the market—and the statisticians. Collapse
of the credit of a corporation is seldom seen far in advance; on the
other hand, innumerable bonds that pay on time all coupons and the
face of the bond are graded iow throughout their existence. This is, of
course, exactly what might be expected.As the future cannot be
known, bonds must be graded on a probability basis and, unless they
are of an ultra-superior quality, the information available for grading
them on such a basis is almost always' quite inadequate.
And, though the market's rating must be considered as of a proba-
bility type, it undoubtedly is not arrived at by conscious matFiematical
calculations.Indeed, the attempt to make any definite and simple
mathematical assumptions as to the elements of the probabilities in-
volved easily leads to conclusions that run counter to what is commonly
assunied'to be fact—such conclusions, for example, as that the yields
of low grade, high yield bonds should be expected to fluctuate less than
the yields of high grade, low yield bonds. And the attempt to formu-
late mathematical assumptions whose development will not lead to
results that conflict with facts or apparent facts all too easily leads to
obviously ad hoc hypotheses.
The simplest of all probability hypotheses is that the probability of
payment of each and every promised future payment is always the
same,—k'forexample. With this assumption, the price of the bond
would, on any specified date, be 90 per centof the price on the same
date of a bond containing an identical set of promises but rated by the
market as 'absolutely secure'. However, unless the bonds were perpetu-
ities, the yield of the lower grade bond would fluctuate less than the
yield of the 'absolutely secure' bond.5
Such an assumption as that the probabilities of payment are all equal
is, of course, quite fanciful.It assumes' that the successive probabilities
Less in a community that did not care for gambling and possibly more in one
that did.
The lower the yield of a particular bond the greater percentage effect on its yield
has a specified percentage, change in its price. For example, if a 4 per cent bond
maturing in eighteen years falls five per cent in price, from 100 to 95, its yield will
increase ten and one quarter per cent (from 4.00per centto 4.41 per cent) ;but if
it falls five per cent in price, from 120 to 114, its yield will increase fifteen per cent
(from 2.60 per cent to 2.99percent).DIFFICULTIES OF 6.1
are completely independent of one another and that the question
whether a particular payment will or will not be met is unrelated to
whether the preceding payments h.ave been met.6 But similar strange
conclusions result from developing much more appealing hypotheses.
'The simplest assumption having ally appreciable air of reality is that
no payment will be met unless all preceding payments have first been
met, but that, as soon as one payment has been met, the probability that
the next payment will be met is the same as previously had been the
probability that the preceding payment would be met. Under this com-
pound assumption, if the probability that the first payment will be met
be designated p, the probability (as of the same date) that the second
payment will be met will be p2. and the probability that the nth payment
will be met will be pfl•In these circumstances the functional relation-
ship between the lower grade bond and the 'absolutely secure' bond is
not (unless the bonds be perpetuities) simply expressible in terms of
/rices,thoughit is so expressible in terms of yields.On. any specified
date the R noteof the lower grade bond willequal!times the R of the
p
'absolutely secure' bond.8
Even 'income' bonds are not exceptions. The payment or non-payment of preced-
ing coupons is at least evidence of ability or lack of ability to pay the next coupon.
7 R =the corresponding to the yield, e.g., if the bond is on a 4 per cent
per atinum basis, R =1.04(per annum). Under the semi-annual convention of the
bond tables R would, of course, equal 1.02 (per half-year)(see Ch. II).
8 The price of the lower grade bond is obtained by discounting, not itsactually
promised interest andprincipal payments, but their mathematical 'expectations' at
the yieldof the 'absolutely secure' bond. The price of the 'absolutely secure' bond
equals
I I I 100
R R2 R" Ru
and th'e lrice of the lower grade bond equals
IP 1p2 100
—+—+.... +—+ .Butit is immediately apparent that this value
R Ru
for the price of the lower grade bond is the same as would be obtained by substi-
tuting forR in the expression for the price of the 'absolutely secure' bond.
I and n are, by the hypothesis of identical promises, the same in both bonds.
For definitions of I, n, and R see Ch. II.
The reader should note here, in passing, that, if tile lower grade bond be assumed
to differ from the higher grade bond not in the rates at which the future promises
are discounted but in the valuations placed on those promises (the 'expectations'), it62 BOND YIELDS AND STOCK PRICES
For example if p= and if, on a particular date, the yield of the
'absolutely secure' bond were 2 per cent per half year, the yield of the
lower grade bond would b.c 3-1/33 per cent per half year.9 If the yield
of the 'secure' bond advanced to 4 per cent per half year, the yield of
the lower grade bond would become 5-5/99 per cent per half year—one
and two-thirds times instead of double its former rate of 3-1/33 per
cent. The yield of the lower grade bond equals a constant term plus a
constant multiple of the yield of the 'secure' bond (see note 9). Its
percentage fluctuations are therefore smaller and not larger than those
of the yield of the secure bond.'°
It would, of course, be possible to construct hypotheses with respect
to the market's estimates of the probabilities of the various payments
being met that would not be inconsistent with the requirement that
low grade, high yield bonds should fluctuate in yield much more than
high grade, low yield bonds. But any such hypothesis would necessarily
be a mere mathematical curiosity.
(Footnote 8concluded)
will have an essentially shorter 'duration', because the size of the 'expectations' would
decrease as their distance in the future increased. Now we know that extent of fluc-
tuation in yield with the passage of time is an inverse function of duration. But it
is hard to say whether or not we have here any significant clue as to why low grade
bonds might tend to fluctuate in yield more than high grade bonds.
The R of the secure bond equals 1.02 and hence the R of the lower grade bond
100
equals 1.02 X (seenote 7). From tins result we get 3-1/33 per cent per half
year as the yield of the lower grade bond.
In general, ifr1 represent the yield of the 'absolutely secure' bond and r2 the
(l—p)r1
yield of the lower grade bond, r2 will equal 100 + —ora constant term
(p) p
plus a constant multiple of the yield of the secure bond.
10Ifthe yield of the lower gradei (higher yield) bond is to fluctuate exactly as the
yield of the 'absolutely secure' bond, in other words if R2 —1=k(R1 —1),where
k is greater than unity, then p, or the probability that each payment will be made if
the preceding payment has been made, is such a function of the yields of the two
bonds that the larger their yields the smaller is this probability of payment of the
lower grade bond. This, of course, amounts to a fluctuation in grade.
R1
As we have seen, p ,but,because R2 —1=k(R1 —1),
R2
R1 1/k_—1\l
—= — +( —whichincreases and decreases as R2 (or R1, as
R2 k R2
I —k+ kR1) does the contrary.DIFFICULTIES OF COMPARISON 63
We saw in the preceding chapter that the yield of a bond was
demonstrably an average, a complicated type of average it is true, but
essentially an average. The assumption that the rates of discount used
during successive future periods are identical was there proven quite
unwarranted. Though it is for many purposes a convenient and useful
fiction, it is always a fiction. We illustrated this fact by bringin.g to
the surface the different rates for different future periods implicit
but hidden in the yields of serial bonds, and we described and explained
how the 'average' that we term the 'yield' of a bond tells us nothing
about the rates of interest of which it is an average. We furthermore
showed that there is no such custom of conscious and deliberate calcu-
lation as would lead to any significant market pronouncement concern-
ing the various rates assigned to the different future periods. Indeed,
to assume the existence of any such pronouncement would be almost as
unscientific and indefensible as to indulge in a 'pathetic fallacy'.
We find ourselves, therefore, faced with adilemma.We can be
virtually certain that any mathematical hypothesis based on the assump-
tion that the constituents of the yields are consciously considered would
not give even an approximately true picture of how the grading is actu-
ally done and the yields actually arrived at. But to shut our eyes to the
composite nature of the yields would be quite as disastrous.
And to top all, our hypothesis would be designed to fit not known
facts but preconceived fancies. For, startling as it may sound, we do
not know that lower grade bonds actually do fluctuate in yield appre-
ciably more than do higher grade bonds. Indeed, there are strong rea-
Sons for suspecting that the excessive fluctuation in the yields of so-
called lower grade bonds is primarily an indication of fluctuation in the
grades assigned by the market to such bonds rather than an indication
that violent fluctuations in yield normally accompany low, but un-
ch.anging, market grading.1'
Sometimes,though rarely, the long term movements of the yield of a particular
bond of not quite the highest grade are, for many years, so nearly the same as
the long term movements of the yields of bonds of the very highest grade as to
suggest strongly that the grade of the slightly poorer bond has been relatively stable
throughout the period. West Shore 4's of 2361 (Bond No. 70) is such a bond. As
may be seen from Chart 2, the long term trends of the yields of that bond (see Line
C of chart) from 1885' to 1930 showed no permanent drift away from the index of
the yields of bonds of the very highest grade (Line B and Line D—which has the
same trend as Line B). However1 as may be seen from the chart1 the intermediate64 BOND YiELDS AND STOCK PRICES
And averaging the yields presents no logical solution of the problem
of comparing the yields of second grade bonds at widely separated
dates. One who had not examined the data carefully and considered
the problem critically might easily think that bond yields should, not
merely practically but also theoretically, be much better adapted to the
making of index numbers than are commodity prices. Surely, such an
one might reason, bonds have a homogeneity that commodities do not
possess. They are concerned with the satisfaction of one great and
undifferentiated desire—the desire for money in the future, while the
different desires that can he satisfied by different commodities are almost
as varied and multiform as are human wants.
Is not the difference between a high grade bond and a low grade
bond (of approximately the same duration) like the difference between
a high grade and a low grade sample of the same commodity rather
than like the difference between two disparate commodities? Is it not
the difference between high grade raw cotton and iow grade raw cotton
or between good potatoes and poor potatoes rather than the difference
between cotton and potatoes?
And is even a difference. between two bonds that results from a
great difference in their durations so fundamental as is the difference
between the two commodities? Cannot the one bond be substituted for
the other in a way that is quite impossible with the commodities? The
proceeds received when a short term bond matures may be reinvested;
and both short and long term bonds can always be sold. While' an in-
vestor is holding a bond, is not the type of good he is receiving from it
unaffected by the length of time that the loan has still to run?
•And surely, if we were to restrict our choice of bonds to those whose
durations were long and not too violently different, we could virtually
eliminate the effects upon their yields of fluctuations in their grades
by averaging the yields. Why not take a hint from students of changes
in the general level of commodity prices? Simply select a representa-
tive group of bonds and follow them through from month to month
and year to year by means of sonic kind of averaging.
The complete answer to this engaging but artless suggestion is that
all the evidence indicates that the variations in the market's'grading of
individual bonds with the passage of time are of such a nature that
(Footnote" concluded)
and cyclical movements of the yields of West Shore 4's were, during all this long
period of forty-five usually lessthanthose of bonds of the very highest gradç,DIFFICULTIES OF COMPARISON 65
their effects could notbeeliminated by any ordinary of the
yields of the bonds. The variations in grade, at different times, of
individual bonds in a group are notof a chance or accidental type, flut-
tering back and forth about some constant norm but always showing
the same relation to and distribution about that norm. Even in the
form of averages, there is no stability to the grades. There is no 'con-
stant norm'. The average and the whole distribution of grades Un-
cloubtedly drift in great secular swings, immense waves, and even up
and down with the movements of the business cycle.
Though fluctuations in the yields of bonds that are not of ultra-
superior quality, relatively to the yields of bonds of such quality, are
not closely enough related to fluctuations in the earnings of the debtor
corporations to make grading upon this basis feasible, they are defi-
nitely and unmistakably correlated with such fluctuations. And, because
the earnings of nearly all corporations tend to rise andfall with the
business cycle and, in any particular industry, to move together over
long periods of time, the grades that the niarket assigns to the bonds
inevitably tend to drift as a group and to move up and down together.
Over nearly all the period covered by the statistics of this study the
steady secular decrease in the 'spreads' of the yields demonstrates un-
mistakably that the lower grade railroad bonds were improving in
grade as a class. When they were not doing so, they were declining in
grade as a class.
It is, of course, true that the lack of confidence engendered by a
business depression tends to increase the relative demand for bonds of
the highest grade and to decrease the relative cleniand for bonds of
lower grades, and it is also true that the absolute volume of bonds of
the highest grade declines and the al)solute volume of bonds of lower
grades increases (as those that were formerly of the highest grade
move into lower classes). And it is further true that the distribution
of bonds by grades could be of such a type that the pressure of bonds
new to the grade would he an inverse function of the grade. And it is
hard to say howmuchof the increase in the 'spread' of the yields of a
group of bonds of different grades during a pronounced decline in
general business may be the result of any such vicious combination of
depressing factors. But we must remember that such factors cannot
materialize and become operativç unless there first occurs a change in
grading, and that, therefore, they cannot be held accountable. tor. more66 BOND YIELDS AND STOCK PRICES
than a part of the increase in 'spread'. Chart 15 suggests strongly that
at least their ultra long term effects are quite negligible.
And, finally,itis perhaps worth noting that the makers of even
commodity price index numbers do not attempt to eliminate the effects
of variations in grade by averaging. As far as possible they quote the
prices of identical grades from year to year, and when changes in
grade become necessary they adjust for them.
Ordinary index numbers of the yields of second grade bonds are to
a greater or less extent like index numbers of stock prices, and such
index numbers are, in one respect, almost sui generis. At least over
long periods of time their chief interest lies in the picture they give of
changes in the nature of the things whose prices are quoted. When the
price of aluminu,m falls from a large number of dollar.s per pound to a
small number of cents no one suggests that the figures indicate that
aluminum was in the early days a distinctly different metal from what
it was later. But a long-continued and pronounced rise in the price of
the common stock of an aluminum producing corporation would usu-
ally 12 be accepted as proof that the market believed that the earning
power of the corporation had increased—in other words, that there
had been a change in the nature of the thing that was being bought
and sold.13
This consideration does not, of course, even suggest that the econo-
mist should be uninterested in the movements of the prices and yields
of second grade bonds—any more than that he should be uninterested
in the movements of stock prices. But it does suggest in the strongest
possible manner that he should consider carefully the meaning of such
movements and realize the inherent difficulties of deducing conclusions
concerning the movements of 'interest rates' from such material. The
economic consequences of a collapse in the second grade bond market
may be just as serious if it is primarily caused by fears of declining
earnings as it would be if it were primarily caused by a rise in the
'preference for present over future goods'. And long term trends in
the quality of second grade bonds may be quite as interesting as lon.g
12 In the absence of some important technical factor such as a radical change in the
capitalization of the corporation.
13 Of course some of the rise of a stock or second grade bond may result from a
decline in the rate at which expected future dividends or interest payments are dis-
counted. The presence of such an influence would usually be shown by a fall in the
yields of long term bonds of the very highest grade.DIFFICULTiES OF COMPARISON 67
term trends in interest rates as exemplified in the yields of bonds of
the highest grade, but it is highly desirable not to confuse the two.
However, if for no other reason than that the problem is presented
in a simpler form, the student of interest rates will tend to be pri-
marilyconcerned with the yields of the very highest grade bonds rather
than with the yields of those of lower grade. The difficulty of measuring
the market's estimate of the former is distinctly less than of the latter.
Though their yields may not properly be described as 'pure interest'—
whatever that may be—there are strong reasons for believing that
the estimates of their 'probability of payment' undergo no such radical
changes as occur with bonds of lower grade. Though individual bonds
that have been given the highest possible rating by both the market
and the financial statisticians may within a few years fail to pay interest,
no such serious variation in grade is found in the market's rating of
AAA or A1+ bonds as such. Though it may not be the same nominal
bond, there is always the possibility of using at the later date some
bond that the market will apparently be rating the same or nearly the
same as it rated the earlier bond. This, as we have already seen, is not
true of lower grade bonds.
Bonds of the highest grade are bonds than which there are none
better. To a very large extent, the market itself tells us which they are.
They are, in general, those bonds that have the lowest yields. Yet an
index number using each month the yield of the particular. bond show-
ing the lowest average yield during that month is not satisfactory, for
the movements of the prices and yields of individual bonds of even the
highest grade are often influenced by other factors than those affecting
such bonds in general. For example, if the market for a particular bond
is 'thin', relatively small purchases by a trustee or other insistent pur-
chaser may run the price tip beyond what it normally would be. Or
again, rumors that the holders of a small 3 per cent issue selling for 85
may be offered par to clear the decks for a reorganization could easily
raise the price to a point at which the yield of the bond would have no
general economic significance.In Chapter IV we discuss at some
length the problem of deciding what is the most representative .yield
for the very highest grade of bonds in view of the fact that it is mad-
visable to trust entirely to the yield of the individual having the
lowest yield.
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may eliminate most of the difficulties encountered when the attempt is
made to use lower grades, it does not remove them all. Rates depend
not only on the security or reliability of the promise but also on what is
promised. Time is of the essence of the interest problem and we saw
in Chapter II that the rates imputable to different intervals of future
time are almost never the same. Because of this fact the yields of long
and short term bonds of even the highest grade would seldom even
theoretically be the same.
And, because all bonds except perpetuities change their 'durations'
with the passage of time, mere averaging of the yields of thesame
nominal bonds is open to the same criticism that could be levelled against
comparing cattle pnces On appreciably different dates by comparing the
prices of identical cattle on the appreciably different dates. The age
distribution of the cattle should be the same on the two dates but, as
they are the same cattle, this cannot be true. If they are now each four
and a half years old, a comparison with four years previous would give
a result entirely different from what it would if they were now all ten
or twelve yearsold. When we compare the prices of cattle at two dif-
ferent dates we do not take the prices of the same cattle. We take the
prices of cattle that are not merely approximately the same grade but
also of comparable ages. Even bonds of the highest grade are not exempt
from this influence. If their maturities he at all close, they change ap-
preciably in 'duration' with the passage of even a short period of time
and this change affects definitely the essential nature of the loan.
From a strictly theoretical standpoint, it would seem necessary to
find, for each date, bonds of the same coupon rate and maturity. How-
ever, the practical investigator will rernenTher that rates depend on
'duration', rather than on 'years to maturity', and that, if the 'duration'
of a bond is not too short, increases or decreases of a few years in the
'time to maturity' affect the yield only negligibly. And, of course, yields
could (at least theoretically) be corrected by a statistically-derived equa-
tion relating yield to duration.'4
'4Practically,any such correction is dangerous. Because bonds whose quotations
are usable for any particular dates are relatively few, and the scatter of their yields
and durationsisveryconsiderable,itisdifficulttodiscover whether the em-
iirical(as opposed to logical)relationship between yields and durations isever'
of the same kind at different dates. Moreover, even ifit were always the same
and even if we knew exactly what it was, the wideness of the scatter of the data
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After security and duration, the theoretically next most interesting
factor influencing the yield of bonds is taxation. A strongcase can,
of course, be made for considering the return from tax-free invest-
ments as theoretically a purer index of the 'preference for present over
future goods' than is the return from taxed investments. Both types
merit study. But they must iiot be confused or mixed. Under a gradu-
ated income tax law, it is impossible to express one as a function of the
other without introducing a thirdvariable. And, if tax-exemption
is only partial, as is usual, the complications of use and comparison are
still further increased. the introduction of the income tax into
American finance, the whole status of such bonds of course completely
changed.
A minor practical difficulty encountered by the economic historian
who attempts to use the yields of tax-exempt or partly tax-exempt bonds
is that, aside from Federal bonds and a very few municipal and state
bonds, the have usually been relatively poor, and quotations
(because sales were largely 'over the counter') less easy to obtain and
less reliable than quotations for bonds of the larger corporations. In the
earlier period covered by this study it was often impossible to identify
state or municipal bonds from the printed titles in the price sheets. For
example, for a number of years there were quotations on the Philadelphia
Stock Exchange for 'Penna. 6's', hut for most of the period we were
unable to discover what particular bonds were being quoted, there bein.g
at all times different 6's of various maturities outstanding. Finally, the
reader must remember that a tax-exempt municipal bond is not neces-
sarily of higher grade than a corporation bond because it sells on a
lower yield basis. Its 'probability of payment' may be very definitely less.
Other factors affecting the yields of bonds are theoretically less in-
triguing though many are of great practical importance. But their nature
is such that their influence can seldom be allowed for.
Changes in yield resulting from changes in the relative importance
of a particular bond in the general economy because of changes in its
markets or marketability are practically impossible tb measureor over-
(Footnote 14concluded)
the statistically-determined constants. The artificiality of the resulting theoretical
yields would offset any possible increase in their homogeneity.
However, the statistical questions involve interesting problems in cor-
relation and someone may at some time care to follow them further than we have
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come. Indefiniteness in the promise itself, such as exists in callable
bonds and in bonds payable in two or more currencies at the option of
the holder, may under some circumstances not be important; but when
it is, it is extremely difficult to correct for, and attempts to do so seem
undesirable if bonds with less ambiguous promises are readily available.
Convertible bonds and bonds carrying special privileges of any kind,
such as 'circulation' privileges, present similar difficulties. The promise
to make future money payments is only one of the elements determining
their prices and yields. They are mongrels and it is next to impossible
to measure the degree of their contamination.
Changes in markets and marketability may have appreciable effects
on the yield of a bond. Paradoxical as it may sound, a case may be
made for the contention that, if the yield of a bond is to represent a
simon-pure long-term interest rate, the bond must have no market what-
soever. The purchaser must buy it because he is willin.g to exchange
present money for certain specified future money payments. If the
yield is to be an index of his preference for present over future money
he must buy the bond because it promises to pay him certain sums of
future money on the dates specifiedthe bond. If he buys $100,000
worth of United States Treasury 3's of 1951 with. the intention of
selling them in five or six months, because he wishes to make a short
term investment and calculates that he can obtain a satisfactory re-
turn by the transaction, his personal valuation of the promises con-
tained in those bonds probably affects little if at all the price he is
willing to pay for them. He may own a profitable business and feel
certain that, if he is to continue in business, he will, in a few months,
need the $100,000—or whatever he may sell the bonds for. Under
such circumstances, he might be unwilling to pay more than thirty or
forty thousand dollars for the bonds, if he knew that he could not
hypothecate or sell them. The fact that he actually pays par or more
has little or no relation to any personal valuation of the promises con-
tained in the bonds. The bonds do not mature for 15 years and the
only personal comparison that he makes between present and future
money is a six-month comparison—nothing more.
Though a corporation may sell a long term bond under conditions
that make it illegal for the corporation to retire the issue before ma-
turity, or even to buy individual bonds in the open market, few pur-
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corporations—would be likely to advance present money if the only
good they could obtain in return was the privilege of receiving the
interest payments and the principal payment when it became due. Nat-
ural persons seldom give to the buying of a bondsame kind of
consideration that they give to the purchase of an annuity. The price
they pay for the annuity is a real measure of the personal importance
that they attach to the promised future payments. They seldom buy
long term bonds in any such frame of mind. The marketability of a
bond is one of the essential factors that determine its price and yield.
Legal restrictions and even mere custom powerfully affect the
markets. As soon as a bond gains entrance to the 'legal' group in which
trustees may invest, its price rises. And customs change. Forty years
ago the prejudice against 'industrial' bonds was wide spread. The recent
collapse of both 'guaranteed' and other real estate mortgages may affect
all real estate loans, good, bad and indifferent, for some years to come.
Indefiniteness in the promise itself is sometimes so disturbing as
to preclude all possibilities of using yield comparisons as indications of
interest rate movements. Though callable bonds may, when selling
much below their call price, be apparently unaffected by this element
of uncertainty, as they approach that price their yields often begin to
lose allsignificance.If there is any strong feeling in the market
that they may actually be called, the yield becomes more or less that
of a short term loan whose maturity is the callable date. In any case
the yield is affected by a factor that can be neither measured nor cor-
rected for except by comparison with another bond that seems strictly
the same in all respects save the callable feature. But why, under such
circumstances, use the callable bond at all?
Another illustration of indefiniteness in the promise is seen in bonds
that are payable in whichever of several currencies the holder may
choose to demand. Though such a clause may have little or no effect
on the yields in times when all the currencies referred to in the inden-
ture are rigidly bound together by some such tie as gold convertibility,
in times of disturbance and chaos in the foreign exchanges its effect
on the prices of the bonds may be so pronounced as to make the yield
in any particular currency quite misleading if considered as an interest
rate.
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leges unrelated to the promise to make future money payments are,
for the student of interest rates, niere niongrels. The yields of United
States 'circulation' bonds were not, in the years before the Federal
Reserve system, interest rates in any simple and direct sense of the
term. Convertible bonds selling anywhere near their conversion price
act as stocks and not as bonds.
Most of these difficulties are, of course, of greater theoretical than
practical importance. When attempting to make really significant corn—
parisons of bond yields at different dates, we can easily refuse to con-
sider mongrel bonds whose prices are affected by other factors than
their promises to pay money. We do not need to use convertible bonds.
Bonds containing indefinite or uncertain promises can likewise be
eliminated. We do not need to use callable bonds—certainly not when
their price is anywhere near the call price. The problem of taxable or
non-taxable bonds can be solved by deciding how we wish to define
yield. When the decision is made, we do not need to mix the two types.
Much can be clone to obtain bonds whose marketability does not undergo
any violent change during the period in which the bonds. are used.
Of course, the accuracy of interest rate or bond yield comparisons
becomes more and more open to question as the difference in time in-
creases. This is true, even ifall possil)le adjustments are made for
changing grade,etc. The yield statistics presentedin this volume
cover seventy—nine years, andit cannot l)e denied that it would be ex-
tremely difficult to describe the characteristics of a bond of the year
1890, let alone 1857, that would be strictly comparable with any pal-
ticular bond at the present time. If the credit of the borrowing cor-
poration or municipality is such that its bonds are today generally con-
sidered 'absolutely' safe in any but a metaphysical the problem
would seem easier. But we must remember that, in 1890 or 1857, bonds
of this class may have been relatively more or less scarce, in view of the
demand for them, than they are now. The yields of even United States
government bonds have, at various times, been unmistakably affected
by changes in the volume outstanding. This can oniy very partially l)e
accounted for by any change in the degree of 'security'. An increase or
decrease in the relative volume of even the highest grade bonds out-
standing will, in the absence of artificial influences, inevitably affect
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thesignificance of their yields would be different at different dates.'5
Over both short and long periods it is easier to obtain an accurate
measure of changes in the average yield of the highest grade bonds
than it is to obtain an accurate measure of changes in the yield of 1)OfldS
of any lower grade. The primary reason for this is that we can give at
least a rough and ready answer to what we mean by the best bonds.
As soon as we leave the relatively secure ground that they are bonds than
which there are none better, and that, in general, they are the bonds that
have the lowest yields, and discuss bonds of any lower grade we are
faced with the problem of defining their grade. The second reason is
that the best bonds do not change grade in any such free and easy
manner as do, other bonds. Their yields are but little affected by the
changing fortunes of individual corporations or even by the changing
fortunes of an industry as a whole.
If the earnings of a corporation cover the interest charges on a lionci
thirty times, the market takes little or no notice of a change in conch-
tions such that the charges are covered only twenty times. On the other
hand, a change from one and a half tinies to once only probably
be considered extremely serious. The yield may rise violently. The lower
the grade of a bond the more it tends to act like a common stock. It
comes to be significantly affected not only by interest rate factors but also
by potential earnings. Whether the yields of the highest grade bonds
are, at any particular time, of more or less economic importance than the
yields of bonds of sonic specific lower grade, their meaning is simpler
and their values are easier to obtain.
Until the World War there was a rather proiiouncecl tendency for
tile movements of the yields of the highest grade bonds in the different
financial centers of the world to become more and more alike. However,
this similarity was almost non-existent in the earliest period covered
by our statistical studies and was only irregularly noticeable after the
disturbances to the various monetary bases that came during the 'War.
The interest rates and bond yields preseiiteclin this volume are all
from the eastern financial centers of the United States, indeed chiefly
from New York City.
For the study of long term as opposed to short term rates, primary
Comparisonsof and early figures for even call money rates or commercial
paper rates are properly subject to considerable questioning. There seems little doubt
thatsecurity of each of these classcs of loans was much less in the earlier period,74 BOND YIELDS AND STOCK PRICES
reliance has been, aside from the last few years, placed on the yields of
American railroad bonds. Index numbers based on the yields of munic-
ipal bonds or bonds of corporations other than railroads have been
introduced only for the sake of checks and comparisons. Such a pro-
cedure may seem to need some defense. The reader, especially if he is
not an American, may wonder why, if we were primarily interested in
the highest grade bonds, we did not use United States government
bonds. The sufficient reason is that, during most of the period covered
by this sttidy, their yields were seriously affected by their circulation
privileges. The bonds were intimately tied, tip with the whole structure
of the national banking system. American 'National Banks' were al-
lowed to issue 'National Bank Notes' based on United States govern-
ment bonds that they had deposited with the Comptroller of the
Currency. Consequently the bonds were bought for two reasons: first,
because of the interest they paid; second because they could be used as
collateral for the issuance of currency. The yields were naturally much
lower than if the bonds had been valued for their interest payments
alone.
It might be thought that, since the formation of the Federal Reserve
system, the yields of Liberty and Treasury Bonds could be considered
an adequate index of long time interest rates in the United States.
However, it must not be forgotten that they also carry special banking
privileges, such as eligibility for use as collateral with the Federal Re-
serve banks at par. Finally, the investigator who might consider using
them is faced with the practical difficulty that the yields of most of them
are ambiguous. The maturity dates are not fixed. They are callable bonds.
We have used index numbers based on the yield of New England
municipal bonds as a check on the results obtained from the railroad
bonds. We did not consider using such indexes as a substitute for the
railroad indexes. The market for municipal bonds has never been such
a highly developed market as that for railroad bonds. The accuracy
and adequacy of the, quotations on which our index of the yields of
New England municipals is based are not to be compared with the ac-
curacy and adequacy of the railroad quotations. Available quotations
were neither very good nor very numerous. Moreover, the fact that
the holder of municipal bonds has always had certain tax exemptions,
which were sometimes and sometimes less valuabi; made suchDIFFICULTIES OF COMPARISON 75
bonds poor material for our purposes. We dropped them entirelyas
soon as the Federal Income Tax Law began to function.
We were faced with the necessity of using bonds from one orniore
industries. We discovered that if bonds are to be used frommore than
one industry, each industry should be used by itself for a reasonably
long period. Switching back and forth or using even the best bonds of
two or more industries at the same time may easily lead to undesirable
statistical results. Rather than to switch from one to another, it would
seem better to use bonds from different industries independently, con-
struct an index from each industry and attempt to arrive at conclusions
by comparing the indexes.
When the decision to use only one industry had finally been made,
the railroad industry was the inevitable choice. There was no other
industry whose securities were of comparable importance in January
1857, the date we knew we could reach by using railroad bonds. Until
many years after 1857 good public utility bonds were scarce. Until very
recently, the bonds of no other industry have had the high credit rating
of railroad bonds. Even in the recent collapse of railroad credit, rail-
road bonds of the very highest grade sold on a lower yield basis than
any other corporation bonds. We constructed some very helpful index
numbers based on the yields of public utility bonds.in recent years. But,
during most of the period studied, not only were such bonds few in
number and mostly of rather low grade but also they were seriously
affected by ambiguity of yield. Most of them had callable or convertible
features, or both.
Accurate daily quotations for the prices of railroad bonds on the
New York Stock Exchange are available back to January 1, 1857. We
were unable to find any official sheets before that date. We did not at-
tempt to carry the study further back by using quotations from news-
papers. Entirely aside from the fact that newspaper quotations were,
in the early days, not nearly so accurate as those contained in the official
sheets, it did not seem worth while to attempt to go further back than
1857. January 1857 carries the series into the period that preceded the
panic of 1857. Only a few years earlier the railroads were in their mere
infancy and price quotations were very scarce and the yields unmistak-
ably but irregular representatives of interest rates. Even for the year
1857 we found only thirteen bonds that could be used. Moreover, the
scatter of the yields was very great. The best bond we used in January76 BOND YIELDS AND PRiCES
1857 had a yield of 6.27 per cent while the worst bond we used had a
yield of 9.84 per cent. It is apparent that, in order to get even thirteen
bonds in 1857, we had to include some decidedly questionable ones.'°
The original sources from which we calculated the yields for the
individual bonds were in all instances price quotations, never yield
quotations. Almost all the bonds were listed on the New York Stock
Exchange, a very few being obtained from the Philadelphia, Boston
or Baltimore Exchanges. No 'over the counter' quotations were used.17
For those bonds that were listed on the New York Stock Exchange we
obtained quotations for the period January 1857 to December 1877
from the New York Stock Exchange official sheets referred to above.
From January 1878 to the present time our primary source for quota-
tion for bonds listed on the New York Stock Exchange was the
files of the Commercial and Financial Chronicle, and the Financial
Review 18 published by the same journal. In many instances, mathemati-
cal calculations that were made on the yields suggested that certain
price quotations were wrong. Wherever such a suggestion occurred
other sources than the Commercial and Financial Chronicle were used
as checks.
In the very earliest period we felt compelled to use almost every rail-
road bond for which we could obtain continuous or nearly continuous
quotations (unless the movements of its yield were unmistakably er-
ratic and violently different from the movements of the average of the
group), but in the period after the first few years, we chose the bonds
with considerable care. In the first place, we discarded all bonds whose
yields were so high as to indicate that their credit was decidedly poor.
We knew that their prices would move more like stock prices than we
desired. We were studying interest rates. When the movements of the
yield of a bond showed any great irregularity, we investigated what was
happening to the road and in the market at that time. Usually we
But the reader must not assume that we present an average of the yields of these
bonds as picturing anything more than the condition of the industry. How these
yields were used to obtain the yields of hypothetical bonds of superlative grade is
discussed in the next chapter.
Only in constructing the indexes of the yields of New England municipal bonds
did we• use 'over the counter' quotations.
IS The Financial Review was not used before 1878, because the prices that it quoted
were 'bid' prices on Friday of each week. All the prices for railroad bonds used in
this hook are actual sale prices. Bonds listed on the Philadelphia, Baltimore and Bos-
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found some outside influence that made the bond undesirable. After
a large number of such investigations, we discarded bonds without in-
vestigation, when the movement of their yields was so violently erratic
as to warrant the assumption that an investigation if made would dis-
close some good reason for
Few bonds with callable or convertible features were used. The de-
cision whether such a bond could be used was based on two considera-
tions. First, we checked its action with the action of a tentative general
index to see whether the callable or convertible features seemed to have
any discoverable effect on its yield. Second, we attempted to decide
logically whether the bond would or would not, in the near future, be
influenced by either the callable or convertible feature. In case of doubt
the bond was not used.2°
As far as possible we used only bonds having fairly continuous price
quotations. We considered the absence of quotations for two or more
months in succession' much more serious than their for
the same number of months not in succession. Interpolations were
made on the assumption that the movements of the logarithms of the
yields of the particular bond in the interpolation period were the same
10Hadthe technique described in Chapter IV been developed before we began our
study, instead of as we progressed, we undoubtedly would have been much less par-
ticular about what bonds we included.
20Whethera bond will or will not be called depends upon its yieldto maturity at
the call price on the call date. If the particular corporation or government can borrow
at the call date (and pay expenses of floating the issue) at a lower rate than the yield
of the bond to maturity at the call price and on the call date, the bond will be called,
otherwise it will not.
For example, if a6per cent railroad bond, having forty years to run, is selling
for $114 (to yield 5.17 per cent to maturity), but is callable thirty years from now
at $112, there might be no good reason for assuming that it would be called—in spite
of the fact that it is not only selling above par but also above the call price. On the
call date at a price of $112, with ten years to run, the yield would be 4.50 per cent.
It might easily happen that this particular railroad would not call the bond because it
could not save money by so doing.
There is one serious exception to the above statements, Sometimes the yield to
maturity on the call date and at the call price is a relatively unimportant element in
deciding whether the bond will or will not be called. Suppose a bond maturing twenty
years from now were callable in ten years at a price that would give a yield of only
2 per cent from the call date to maturity. Such a bond might be called if it were
necessary to get that particular bond out of the way to clear the decks for some con-
solidation or reorganization. Even rumorssuch consolidations or reorganizations
will powerfully affect the price (and hence the yield) of a bond. However, such cases
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as the movements of the logarithms of the gencEal index, plus or minus
a straight-line trend.2' An examination of Appendix A, Table 3 will
show that interpolations are not numerous. Only in seven years were
they in excess of ten per cent of the total number of individual yields.
The largest percentage of interpolations (13.63) occurs in the thirteen-
month period January 1898 to January 1899. After 1919 almost no
interpolations were necessary.
With very few exceptions, no bond was selected unless it could be
used in the index numbers for at least six years without coming closer
than ten years to maturity. Since 1909 no bond was kept in the indexes
after it had less than fourteen years to maturity. The inclusion of
relatively short term bonds in the earlier period was unavoidable. There
were not enough longer term bonds available at that time.
No attempt was made to attain a geographical distribution of the rail-
roads whose bonds were used. We are concerned with interest rates, not
with changing economic conditions in various parts of the United States.
It was considered more important to know that the bonds were being
bought and sold in the same market than to know the geographical
location of the property. Even Canadian railroad bonds were used if
they were actively traded in on the New York Stock Exchange.
Because we were primarily concerned with interest rates rather than
21Theactual arithmetic of the procedure was as follows: suppose the yield of a
bond was lacking for June and that in the particular 13 months under discussion 27
bonds were used. Now suppose that we had the yields of 25 bonds for May, June
and July. From these 25 bonds index numbers of yields fOr the three months would
be constructed. The difference between the logarithm of the yield of the particular
bond in May and the logarithm of the yield of the index in May would then be
found. Similarly the difference between the logarithm of the yield of the particular
bond in July and the logarithm of the yield of the index in July would be found. If
the logarithm of the yield of the particular bond in May, minus the logarithm of
the yield of the index number in May be represented by x, and the logarithm of the
yield of the particular bond in July, minus the logarithm of the index in July be
represented by y, then to the logarithm of the index number in June is added
X The anti-logarithm of the result is then taken as the yield of the particular
bond in June.
After the first index had been constructed some new bonds were introduced. How-
ever, the existing interpolations were not then recalculated, since it was apparent
that so little difference would be made that recalculation would not be worth while.
The interpolated yields are therefore not always exactly what they would have been
had they been based on the final index number. The effects of this technical incon-
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withmeresecurity we did not hesitate to use two or more bonds
of the same road. Indeed, we sometimes used two bonds of the same
road and secured by the same mortgage, but of different issues, where
the only difference was in the coupon rates. The reader must remember
that even if two bonds are of the same road, have identical maturity,
security, etc., if they are not identically the same bonds, they commonly
show a considerable degree of variation in their minor erratic fluctua-
tions. Arbitrage in bonds does not entirely eliminate such differences.
If an individual has a block of bonds which he desires to sell and places
them on the market in rather rapid. succession, his selling will depress
the price of that particular bond without necessarily affecting to a cor-
responding degree the price of another bond, though it be of the same
road and have the same maturity and an almost identical position in
the capital structure.
The prices from which yields were calculated were arithmetic aver-
ages of the high and low prices for each bond for each month. It would
have been impossible within the time at our disposal to have calculated
monthly averages from daily quotations—and few of the bonds were
sold every day in the month. The average monthly price obtained
from a high and a low was assumed to be the price of the bond at the
middle of the month. The yields were first calculated from ordinary
bond tables and then checked with a Johnson and Darville bond yield
chart.22 In Appendix A, Table 1is given a description of each bond
used; in Appendix A, Table 2 are given the monthly high and low
prices of each bond used from January 1857 to January 1879 inclusive.
The latter table was introduced for this particular period to facilitate
the work of future students of the subject. We felt that some investi-
gators might be interested in checking up the relations of the price of
greenbacks in gold to the movements of these bonds during this period
and for that purpose might be interested not only in yields but also
in prices. The table is not continued beyond January 1879. In the
succeeding gold period the reader is likely to be satisfied with 'yields'.
Moreover, while it is difficult to obtain some of these prices of the
earlier period, it is relatively easy to obtain the prices of the later period.
22Theuse of this nomograph makes arithmetic interpolation between yields and be-
tween dates unnecessary. The possible error in reading is seldom more than one
one-hundredth of one per cent. The chart was patented in 1922 by its inventors
and is sold by Prentice-Hall Inc., New York City. It is described, with illustrations,
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They are nearly all contained in the files of the Commercial and Finan-
cial Chronicle. In Appendix A, Table 3 is presented the yield of each
individual bond monthly from January 1857 to january 1936, inclu-
sive: Appendix A, Chart 29 shows the period during which each in-
clividual bond was used in the construction of index numbers.
Having selected the bonds and calculated their yields we proceeded
to consider the construction of index numbers.23 The first problem that
now presented itself was that of adjusting the yields in order to equalize
the rnaturities—or better perhaps say to equalize the 'durations'. As
our problem was the measurement of long time interest rates, it seemed
desirable to define the term 'long'. If we defined 'long' as 15 or any
other specific number of years' 'duration', we were immediately faced
with the fact that, in any particular year, none of our bonds had
a duration of exactly 15 years. Moreover, even if each of their dura-
tions were exactly 15 years, with each succeeding year those durations
would decrease.
\'Ve asked ourselves, would it not be possible from the actual yields
of bonds with various durations to calculate what the probable yield
would have been if each bond had hadall times the same duration—
say 15 years. We puzzled over this problem for some time. In some
periods we found a quite perceptible degree of correlation between yield
and duration. In general when short term rates such as those for call
money, time money and commercial paper were high, the l)onds with
shorter durations tended to show the higher yields, and vice versa,
when short terni rates were low, the bonds with shorter durations
tended to show the lower yields—though in almost all cases there were
some evidences of 'lag'. However, the scatter was always extremely
great and the correlation always small. The bonds differed not only
in duration but also in grade. The regression was unmistakably non-
linear though the curvature was, of course, distinctly less than if
maturity had been used instead of 'duration'. We experimented with
various functions of the yields; and with partial regression, attempting
to introduce the element of security into the problem by assuming it to
be measurable in terms of the yields themselves. But the scatter invariably
23Indexnumbers intended to show the course of long term interest rates must be
based on andnot on prices. A 4 per cent bond selling on a 5 per cent basis will
increase in price from year to year if it remains on a 5 per cent basis. Similarly a 6
per cent bond selling on a 5 per cent basis will decrease in price from year to year.
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remained so as to make any equation derived from the data unmis-
takably We finally gave up all attempts to correct for 'dura-
tion'. The yields always seemed to smack too strongly of
unreality.
\'Ve must that consequently a disturbing element, for which we
have not coi1rectecl, remains in all our results. Moreover, as both the
average mattirity and the average duration of the bonds we used were
shorter inearlier than in the later period, the index numbers nat-
urally refer in the earlier period to shorter term interest rates than
they do in tF1e later period.
In constructing any index number of railroad bond yields for such
a longperi4as from 1857 to 1936 it naturally is impossible to carry
the same bonds through the index. The bonds mature and disappear
and, if they are being used to measure long term interest rates, they
must be dis arded years before they mature. This condition naturally
many substitutions in the index. Such substitutions were
always rnadt in a January. The resulting index number is therefore a
'chain' index number, made up of 79 separate pieces, each extending
over 13 The direct comparisons are always from one January
to thesecon.'d January, from the second Januaryto the third, and so
on, the intervening months f ailing into their respective places. In other
words, there is always a, group of bonds that is unchanged froni one
January to Ihe next, making possible a comparison from that January
to the next with an identical group of bonds. The 79 separate index
numbers, each covering 13 months, were chained together in the fol-
lowing nianiper: If the January 1924 average obtained from the yields
of the of bonds used in the 13 months, January 1924 to January
1925, was eleven-tenths of the January 1924 average obtained from the
yields ofgroup of bonds used, in the 13 months, January 1923 to
January 1944, it would be multiplied by ten-elevenths.. If the adjust-
ment were made backwards the second January average would
be by eleven-tenths.
As the bohds used in the index number are changed, comparisons of
distant might be thought to become more and more dangerous.
On the hand, we must remember that railroad bonds constitute
a relatively homogeneous group. The introduction of even an entirely
new group )f bonds each January would not necessarily lead to bad
results. We seldom changed any large percentage of the bonds in any82 BOND YIELDS AND STOCK PRICES
one January. Both the number dropped and the number introduced
were usually small, but this is probably not very important. Perhaps
as many dangers are connected with keeping the same bonds through-
out as arise from changing them. We must remember that there is no
particular magic in continuing to quote the price of 'thecow with the
crumpled horn' until she becomes a museum piece.
No 'weighting' was used in the construction of any of the various
index numbers.24 Each yield has a weight of one. It did not seem advis-
able to attempt to assign other than equal weights to the individual
yields. While it would be possible to construct a set of arbitrary weights
based on the number of bonds outstanding, the number traded in, or
other similar criteria, it is questionable whether there would be much
value in any such procedure. Weighting by number of shares outstanding
would seem highly reasonable if we were constructing an index number
of stock prices. And weighting by number of bonds outstanding might
be defended in the construction of an index of bond yields that was
designed not to exhibit the course of interest rates but rather the
fortunes of the borrowing corporations and of the investing public.It
would seem a distinctly arbitrary and erratic system of weighting were
we concerned primarily with interest rates. On the other hand, if we
use number of bo,nds traded in as a basis for a set of weights, we shall
find ourselves weighting an issue less and less heavily as it becomes
seasoned. The heaviest trading occurs immediately after a bond is
issued. Some of the best bonds become more and more inactive, until
finally they cannot be used at all because months elapse without a single
sale.If, however, anything happens to shake the confidence of the in-
vesting public in an issuing corporation, its bonds come out of safe
deposit boxes and the volume of trading immediately increases.
As our index numbers are—from the nature of the data—necessarily
'chain' numbers, it is extremely important that no type of averaging
used shall involve any mathematical 'drift'. We present index numbers
based on geometric and arithmetic averaging, but the averages are
averages of the yields themselves. They are not averages of 'relatives'.
Not merely the geometric but also the arithmetic averages are therefore
free from mathematical drift.
24Exceptthe implicit weighting in the illustrations of the results of constructing
chain index numbers from January to January from averages of relative prices with
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There are' Ldrifts in the averages, to be sure, but they are not mathe-
matical drifts. They are economic drifts. They are caused by secular
and cyclical in the grades of the bonds. Because their outlook
is more affected by fluctuations in earnings, lower grade bonds
of course in grade more violently than do bonds of better grade.
This explains why the geometric and arithmetic averages show long
time tendencies to drift together or drift apart. From 1857 to 1872 and
from 1920 t(1930, and indeed in general from 1857 to 1930, indexes
based on arithmetic averaging and indexes based on geometric averaging
drift together as we move forward in time. During other periods, such
as 1911 to 1920 and 1930 to 1932, they move more or less sharply apart.
But the dr1ift is an economic drift. So long as an industry as a whole
is, either of general business conditions or because of conditions
peculiar to tijie industry, in a period of health and growth, the spread
between the :4elds of any two bonds, one low grade and one high grade,
will tend toecrease. Similarly, the 'scatter' of the yields of a group of
bonds of various grades will tend to decrease and hence the arithmetic
and geometr c averages of the yields will tend to approach each other.
If the industry enters upon a period of declining business and profits,
the scatter of the yields and hence the spread between the arithmetic
and geometric averages will tend to increase.
But this drifting together and apart of the arithmetic and geometric
index numbers is of greater theoretical than practical importance. For
all practical purposes (as may be seen from Appendix A, Table 4) the
two index numbers move together. But there is a drift in both which is
of great impurtance. In January 1925 the figure for the geometric index
(4.774 per cent) and the figure for the arithmetic index (4.776 per cent)
are the actual geometric average and the actual arithmetic
average of all the bonds used in that month. However, the chainindex
constructed geometric averages shows a yield of 9.517 per cent in
January 185'7 although the actual geometric average of all the bonds
used in 1857 was only 7.994 per cent.
Moreover, the above comparison does not present the picture in as
strong colorE as it should be presented. There is every reason for believ-
ing that the Iponds which each month throughout the period showed the
very lowest yields were much more nearly of the same grade
throughout the period than was the average of all the bonds. Now the
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152 per cent of the yield of the 'best bond' in the same month (6.27per
cent) though in January 1925 the index (4.774 per cent) is only 106 per
cent of the yield of the best bond used in that month (4.50 per cent).
The arithmetic differences are even more startling than the ratios. In
January 1857 the difference between the geometric index and the yield
of the best bond was 3.25 per cent while in January 1925 it was only
0.27 per cent. The relations of the geometric index to the yields of the
best bonds and to the actual geometric averages of the bonds used each
year may be seen in Chart 1. The evidences of a pronounced downward
drift are unmistakable.
The arithmetic average index numbers show a slightly greater down-
ward drift. \'Ve have used the geometric average index numbers to illus-
trate drift because the reader is less likely to wonder whether he is not
faced with a problem of niatheniatical drift or, as Professor Fisher
terms it, 'bias'.
In the next two chapters we discuss further the nature of this economic
drift. We describe not only how it can be eliminated to obtain index
numbers of the yields of hypothetical bonds. of superlative grade hut also
how it can be separated out, measured, and used by itself as an index of
th.e degree of difference at any particular time between the movements
of the yields of high and low grade bonds. Finally, we describe its re-
lation to the movements of the yields of preferred stocks and the move-
nients of the prices of common stocks and show how, when properly
interpreted, it brings together all securities into one great family.